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degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for 
Assault by a Prisoner, a Third Degree Felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUfiS 
1. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to establish 
that Mr. Duran had a complete defense to unlawful actions by prison 
guards? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Duran's 
pre-trial motion to reduce the charge against him to a misdemeanor? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution 14th Amendment, SI: 
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Utah Constitution, Article 1, §§7, 9 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Sec. 9 [Excessive bail and fines-Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and 
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
RUDY RINGO DURAN, : Case No. 870531-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for Assault by a 
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102.5 (1953 as amended) following a jury trial held October 
29, 30, 31, and November 1, 1987, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 28, 1986, Rudy R. Duran was an inmate housed 
at the Utah State Prison, cell-block A, number 320, located on the 
third tier (T. 236, 304). On October 28, 1986, at approximately 
6:45 p.m., a prison guard, Norman Carpenter, conducted a "shakedown" 
or cell search of the cell occupied by inmate John Neely (T. 228-29, 
231). That search was conducted while Neely and nine other inmates 
were locked out of their second tier cells and locked into the 
recreation area one tier below (T. 220). Neely objected to the 
search being conducted in his absence and climbed a fence to protest 
Carpenter's actions (T. 219-21, 229-32). At least one of the other 
nine inmates in the recreation area joined Neely in climbing the 
fence to the second tier (T. 233), and many of the other inmates on 
A block shouted and screamed their opinions of the incident 
(T. 222). Rudy Rmgo Duran was not one of the nine inmates locked 
in the recreation area; he was locked in his own cell on the third 
tier (T. 236, 304). 
The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to what occurred 
between inmate Neely and guard Carpenter (T. 219-26, 228-35); but 
for purposes of this appeal, suffice it to say that an altercation 
ensued which resulted in a pushing exchange between them with Neely 
being escorted to a holding area and ultimately maximum security 
(T. 237). Mr. Duran witnessed this altercation between Neely and 
Carpenter (T. 304). 
At 10:32 p.m. - approximately four hours after the 
exchange with Neely - Officer Carpenter completed a report detailing 
the incident (T. 240). Mr. Duran was not mentioned in that report 
(T. 240). An hour later, Officer Carpenter wrote a report charging 
Mr. Duran with "threat of verbal violence" (T. 240-41). However, 
Officer Carpenter admitted that he did not personally hear or 
observe anything to form the basis of that report (T. 241). Officer 
Carpenter then went to the third tier of A block and advised 
Mr. Duran that he had written him up and that he personally would 
insure that Mr. Duran would be next to go to maximum security as a 
management problem (T. 242-43). Officer Carpenter recalled his 
exact words as "if you keep your bullshit up, I'll send your ass to 
max" (T. 243). 
The following morning, October 29, Walter Yakovich, 
acting lieutenant of A block, arrived at work at 8:00 a.m. (T. 
124). Starting at 8:20 a.m., he reviewed the three reports filed on 
the incident the night before (by Officers Carpenter, Swanti and one 
other guard); acting Lieutenant Yakovich surmised from the reports 
that Mr. Duran had attempted to incite other inmates to assault an 
officer (Carpenter) (T. 124, 105). Mr. Yakovich then spoke with 
Officer Debra Swanti, who had been on the shift the night before 
with Officer Carpenter, another officer, and an inmate (T. 124-25). 
Mr. Yakovich did not speak with Officer Carpenter nor inmate Neely 
regarding Mr. Duran's involvement, if any, m the previous night's 
incident (T. 126). Neither did he talk with Mr. Duran (T. 148). At 
9:10 a.m., he telephoned his supervisor, Captain Johnson, and 
together they decided to move Mr. Duran from A block to maximum 
security (T. 105-06). 
Acting Lieutenant Yakovich summoned two other officers, 
Olm and Uriarte, and went to number 320 A block to move Mr. Duran 
to maximum security (T. 106). On arriving at Mr. Duran's cell, 
Acting Lieutenant Yakovich instructed Mr. Duran, "Rudy, get 
dressed. We are going to max" (T. 131). The three officers then 
had the cell door opened and stepped inside (T. 132). Mr. Duran, 
who had been sleeping or lying on the cot in his undershorts, asked 
what he had supposedly done wrong; the officers refused to detail 
any particular violation (T. 131-34). Mr. Duran was told to turn 
around and be cuffed (T. 133). Officer Uriarte testified that 
Acting Lieutenant Yakovich told Mr. Duran "that he was being moved, 
that he would know the charges through the disciplinary system" (T. 
178), and that he was being moved "for all the little things and 
because [he] was a management control problem" (T. 182, 185). 
Mr. Duran dressed but expressed a reluctance to go to 
maximum security; he moved his arms from their previously crossed 
position, dropped them to his side, and broadened his stance 
(T. 139, 182-83). The three officers testified that they perceived 
this action as a combative stance or fighting position (T. 140, 166, 
183). Yet, testimony demonstrated that Mr. Duran never threatened 
them (T. 140, 189), and two officers testified that Mr. Duran even 
took steps backwards away from the officers to the end of the cell 
(T. 166, 183). Officer Uriarte additionally testified, by 
refreshing his recollection with his report, that Mr. Duran 
repeated, at least twice, "Don't touch me," including once when the 
three officers were moving in toward him (T. 186-88). At that point, 
Acting Lieutenant Yakovich reached for a set of handcuffs from 
Officer Olm, and Mr. Duran swung and punched Acting Lieutenant 
Yakovich in the nose (T. 188-89). 
The punch by Mr. Duran broke Acting Lieutenant Yakovich's 
nose necessitating a trip to the prison infirmary where a 
physician's assistant placed a splint in the nose and instructed 
Yakovich to put a lot of ice on it and to take some aspirin 
(T. 161-64). Acting Lieutenant Yakovich testified that the punch 
had blurred his vision for a few seconds (T. 137), yet he was still 
able, with the assistance of the other two officers, to force Mr. 
Duran to the cement floor of the cell and place handcuffs on him 
(T. 138-89). In the struggle, Mr. Duran's face was pushed into the 
cement floor with sufficient force to break his dental plate 
(T. 309, 327). 
Once subdued and cuffed, Mr. Duran was taken to maximum 
security where he was placed in isolation - also known as the hole 
(T. 310). 
At the end of the State's case, Mr. Duran made a motion 
to dismiss the charge against him asserting that his actions were 
justified (T. 205). The trial court denied that motion (T. 206). 
Mr. Duran testified in his own behalf. He explained that 
the three guards awakened him from his sleep (T. 306), and that they 
would not explain what he had done wrong (T. 307). Mr. Duran 
testified that he had been beaten by guards on a prior occasion 
after they had placed handcuffs on him (T. 316); and after the Neely 
incident the night before, and the threats that he would be next, he 
feared that the three officers were there to assault him (T. 308, 
315, 318). He explained his position to the guards and told them he 
would go to maximum security but requested that they not handcuff 
him (T. 307). 
Mr, Duran admitted refusing to be handcuffed because of 
his fear of a beating (T. 314). He testified that the presence of 
three guards at his door, and then in his cell, was a threat because 
"it only takes one officer to handcuff an inmate" (T. 315). 
Mr. Duran testified that under different circumstances he would have 
left the cell in a peaceful manner (T. 311-12). 
The defense introduced testimony regarding prison 
policies and procedures (T. 279-301), and a copy of the Inmate 
discipline Procedures Manual was presented and accepted into 
evidence (T. 281, 349, Defendant's Exhibit #8). Mr. Duran alleged 
that many of the procedures were not properly followed and that 
others are inadequate to protect his constitutional rights. The 
State insisted the procedures were both followed and adequately 
protected Mr. Duran's rights. 
The case was then given to the jury who ultimately 
returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict of Assault by a 
Prisoner (T. 389). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Duran had a complete defense to the Assault by a 
Prisoner charge for which he was convicted. 
The prison guards violated Mr. Duran's due process 
rights, both federal and state, when they unlawfully attempted to 
move him from 'A' block to maximum security without providing him 
with a hearing. 
Furthermore, no factual basis existed to support the 
prison guard's decision to move Mr. Duran to maximum security. 
Mr. Duran had not done anything wrong and was unfairly and 
arbitrarily selected for the move to maximum security. 
Mr. Duran was within his rights to defend himself against 
the unlawful and unreasonable force used against him by the three 
officers attempting to move him. 
Finally, the pre-trial motion to reduce the charge 
against Mr. Duran from a felony to a misdemeanor was erroneously 
denied. Mr. Duran insists that the denial of the motion prejudiced 




SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED THAT RUDY RINGO 
DURAN HAD A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO THE ASSAULT 
CHARGE. 
A. PRISON GUARDS WERE UNJUSTIFIED IN ENTERING 
MR. DURAN'S CELL AND ATTEMPTING TO MOVE HIM TO 
MAXIMUM SECURITY. 
1. The attempt to move Mr. Duran from his unit in A block to 
the more restrictive maximum security unit was in violation of both 
federal and state due process protections. Fourteenth Amendment, 
United State Constitution; Article 1, §7, Utah Constitution. The 
prison guards characterized Mr. Duran's move to maximum security as 
a management move (T. 147). This position was purportedly 
buttressed by testimony explaining that the Inmate Discipline 
Procedures segregate major and minor infractions (Exhibit #8 at FD 
01/03.01 et. seg.), and also allow for non-punitive isolation or 
administrative segregation (Id. at FD 01/04.00 et. seg.). These 
policies, however, were not complied with, and in any event do not 
support the actions of the prison guards.1 
The United States Supreme Court has mandated that 
although the rights of prisoners are diminished by certain 
exigencies of prison life, 
[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of 
constitutional protections when he is 
imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain 
drawn between the Constitution the prisons of 
this country. . . . [Prisoners] may not be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Contrary to this 
declaration, the Utah State Prison and several prison guards at that 
institution deprived Mr. Duran of his constitutional guarantees of 
due process. 
1 Various portions of the Inmate Discipline Procedures 
cited and relied on by the prosecution and state witnesses were 
either inadequate (FD 01/03.01 et. seg., distinguishes between major 
and minor infractions by punishment rather than conduct thereby 
failing to give notice) or not complied with (fairness, FD 01/02.02; 
due process hearing, FD 01/01.03; and extended isolation, FD 
01/07.03, A,B, & C). However, a full discussion here of those 
individual errors, although not insignificant, is not necessary 
because they are encompassed within the claims of due process 
violations of both the state and federal constitutions. Critical 
for purposes of this appeal is that inmates get copies of these 
policies (T. 283) and rely on the representations therein. 
Accordingly, an inmate may be aware when actions by prison guards 
exceed the scope of their authority. 
In Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397, 402 (N.D. Cal 
1976), affirmed 434 U.S. 1052 (Feb. 21, 1978), the three judge panel 
clarified that prisoners who are moved to a maximum security unit, 
be it for disciplinary or for administrative reasons, suffer a 
severe impairment of the residuum of liberty they possess, and that 
such impairment triggers the requirement for due process 
safeguards. In reaching its conclusion the Wright v. Enomoto court 
reiterated an earlier conclusion of the United States Supreme Court: 
[Imposition of "solitary" confinement] 
represents a major change in the condition of 
confinement and is normally imposed only when 
it is claimed and proved that there has been a 
major act of misconduct. Here . . . there 
should be minimum procedural safeguards as a 
hedge against arbitrary determination of the 
factual predicate for imposition of the 
sanction. 
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. at 402 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 571-72 n.19 (1974)). 
In Wright v. Enomoto the court held that prisoners moved 
to maximum security for administrative purposes must be provided 
with at least the minimal due process safeguards required for 
prisoners subject to maximum security confinement for disciplinary 
reasons. 462 F.Supp. at 403. The court quickly pointed out, 
however, that the deprivation suffered by a prisoner confined for 
administrative reasons is greater than that suffered by one confined 
on a disciplinary charge; the court also expressed that even more 
procedural protections may be required for the intrusive confinement 
of maximum security for administrative reasons. Id. 
The Wright v. Enomoto court listed the minimal 
requirements as: 
(1) written notice of the reasons in 
sufficient detail to enable the prisoner to 
prepare a response or defense, said notice to 
be furnished, except in case of genuine 
emergency, before initial placement in the 
maximum security unit, but, in any event, not 
more than forty eight (48) hours after such 
initial placement: 
(2) a fair hearing before one or more 
prison officials, said hearing to be held not 
less than seventy-two (72) hours after 
placement in the maximum security unit unless 
the inmate requests, in writing, additional 
time in which to prepare a defense; 
(3) representation by counsel-substitute 
when prison officials determine that the inmate 
is illiterate or that the complexity of the 
issues makes it unlikely that he can collect 
and present the evidence necessary for an 
adequate comprehension of the case; 
determination and designation of 
counsel-substitute to be made at the time of 
the giving of the aforesaid notice; if 
counsel-substitute is not provided, the reasons 
must be stated in writing at the time of the 
hearing; 
(4) an opportunity to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence unless prison officials 
determine in good faith that permitting such 
evidence will be unduly hazardous to 
institutional safety or correctional goals; 
(5) a written decision including references 
to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for 
such confinement. 
462 F.Supp. at 404-05 (emphasis added). Cf. ABA Standards relating 
to the Legal status of Prisoners, Standards 23-3.1, 23-3.2, and 
23-3.3 (1980). Although virtually none of these requirements were 
met in Mr. Duran's case up to the time of his criminal trial over 
one year later (T. 366, R. 177), as noteworthy is that his move to 
maximum security was a blatant abuse of authority performed in bad 
faith for reasons left unarticulated and unsupportable by the 
facts. Moreover, Mr. Duran was allegedly moved for administrative 
reasons, not punitive reasons, and therefore, more than the above 
mentioned due process protections should have been afforded him. 
Requirement number 1 of the Wright v. Enomoto court 
insists that written notice, in sufficient detail, should have been 
give to Mr. Duran before initial placement in maximum security. The 
permissible exception is only available in the case of genuine 
emergency. In Mr. Duran's case no emergency existed. Furthermore, 
the guards not only did not provide him with detailed written 
notice, they refused to even provide him with an acceptable oral 
explanation. Mr. Duran asked them why he was being moved, and the 
reply he received was something proximatmg "for all the little 
things you have done" (T. 182, 185). Such a response dramatically 
supports that no emergency existed and conclusively demonstrates an 
utter lack of notice. 
An important caveat at this juncture is that the prison 
guard's response, for all the little things you have done, just may 
have been the best possible answer because, in reality, no 
legitimate reason existed for the guards to justify the move. (See 
Point I A 2, infra.) Notwithstanding this observation, the 
procedures employed in moving Mr. Duran grossly lacked any parallel 
to the minimum due process safeguards assured a prisoner moved to 
maximum security for disciplinary reasons and fall even shorter of 
the requisite due process afforded to a prisoner moved to maximum 
security for administrative purposes. 
Mr. Duran asserts that an administrative move to maximum 
security — barring the exception of real and genuine emergency — 
must require a hearing before the placement in maximum security. 
That hearing would be accompanied by the panoply of rights which 
attach in disciplinary placements and would allow for a full and 
fair hearing insuring the safeguards of due process. A hearing 
before the placement in maximum security would give assurance that 
retaliatory and arbitrary misuse of authority (or manipulation by 
inmates) would be eliminated or minimized and at the very least 
ferretted out before a deprivation of the inmate's liberty interest 
occurs. 
Examining this issue under the Utah Constitution further 
supports that Mr. Duran's rights were violated by the move to 
maximum security. The Utah Supreme Court has often discussed that 
the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, §7, 
affords, or may afford, greater protections than the federal counter-
part. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); and Comment, 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah 
Law Review 319. See also State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
The facts of this case at bar demand that inmates at the 
Utah State Prison be afforded greater protections before an 
administrative move to maximum security. In State v. Brickey, 714 
P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court gave broader scope to 
the State Due Process Clause to insure that abuses of refiling 
criminal charges were curtailed thereby safeguarding an accused's 
rights by limiting the harshness of repetitive preliminary 
examinations and the accompanying hardships. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 
647. Likewise, in Mr. Duran's case the Due Process Clause of 
Article 1, §7, must operate to protect an accused from the loss of a 
liberty interest by requiring a hearing bore the harshness of the 
administrative move to maximum security with its accompanying 
hardships. Mr. Duran was not afforded such a hearing and his rights 
were violated. The events which followed the violation of his due 
process rights would likely have been eliminated because the hearing 
could have resolved the conflicts and disclosed the inadequacy of 
the need for a move to maximum security. 
Supporting Mr. Duran's interpretation of the Utah Due 
Process Clause is Article 1, §9, of the Utah Constitution. That 
clause, in pertinent part, states, "Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." While this language 
has yet to be interpreted in its "cruel and unusual punishment" 
context, State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986), its plain 
language supports the assertions of Mr. Duran. Mr. Duran's move to 
maximum security, without a hearing before the move, was 
unnecessary. No emergency existed. Even assuming arguendo, that 
some action needed to be taken — which Mr. Duran does not concede 
— a less rigorous action was available. Mr. Duran could have been 
placed in the holding cell of his own unit to await a hearing. 
Evidence was introduced at trial which indicated that such a cell 
was available (T. 155, 296); and that just the night before, inmate 
Neely had been placed in that cell prior to his ultimate move to 
maximum security (T. 237). At the very least Mr. Duran should have 
been treated the same way. 
As the events transpired, three guards appearing at 
Mr. Duran's cell door, awakening him, and then entering and refusing 
to give a legitimate explanation for the move, subjected Mr. Duran 
to unnecessary rigor. The guards1 insistence on taking him "the 
easy way or the hard way" (T. 319), and their ultimate use of 
excessive force in roughly forcing his face to the concrete floor 
and braking his dental plate (T. 309, 327), was also unnecessary 
rigor. The decision to move Mr. Duran to maximum security without a 
prior hearing was unnecessary. Further, the actions of the guards 
in attempting to effect the move were equally unnecessary and were 
in violation of Mr. Duran's constitutionally protected rights as 
assured by Article 1, §§ 7 and 9 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. The decision to move Mr. Duran to maximum security was 
not justifiable from the facts. Even examining the facts in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict, State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982), the decision to move Mr. Duran from 
A-block to maximum security was unsupported and unjustified. During 
the Neely incident of the night of October 28, 1986, Officer 
Carpenter was preoccupied with inmate Neely and one other inmate who 
were both out of their cells and approaching him (T. 233). Officer 
Carpenter's testimony revealed that he was attuned only to the 
response of the officers and the two assault situations from Neely 
and the other unnamed inmate (T. 236-37). In fact. Officer 
Carpenter's testimony disclosed some confusion as to where Mr. Duran 
may have been housed at the time of the incident (T. 235-36), and he 
admitted not seeing or hearing Mr. Duran do or say anything at all 
(T. 238). 
Officer Carpenter filed a report on the Neely incident; 
that report did not mention Mr. Duran (T. 240). An hour later — 
five hours after the incident — Officer Carpenter wrote a second 
report alleging Mr. Duran had made a "threat of verbal violence" 
(T. 240-41). Again, however, Officer Carpenter admitted he had not 
heard or observed anything to form the basis of that report 
(T. 241). Only after writing the report did Officer Carpenter go 
talk to Mr. Duran; that visit was not to investigate the alleged 
threat, however, but rather was to inform Mr. Duran that he had 
written him up and that he [Officer Carpenter] personally would see 
that Mr. Duran would be next to go to maximum security (T. 242-43). 
Acting Lieutenant Yakovich arrived at work the following 
morning, October 29, 1986, and reviewed reports of the previous 
evening. Acting Lieutenant Yakovich testified he relied primarily 
on the Carpenter report for his conclusion that Mr. Duran be moved 
to maximum security (T. 127). Specifically, that report stated only 
that Mr. Duran was heard making some sort of threat; it did not say 
who heard the threat nor how the voice was determined to be 
Mr. Duran's (T. 128). Acting Lieutenant Yakovich did not speak with 
Officer Carpenter for more information but chose only to read 
secondary reports from an Officer Swanti and one other officer whom 
he could not recall by name (T. 127). Yakovich did speak with 
Officer Swanti and an inmate but did not attempt to speak with 
Mr. Duran (T. 124-25, 148). Acting Lieutenant Yakovich's 
investigation took thirty minutes whereupon he called his 
supervisor, Captain Johnson, and together — over the phone and 
without Captain Johnson having the benefit of the reports — they 
determined to move Mr. Duran to maximum security (T. 105-06, 130). 
Officer Swanti's testimony revealed that she too lacked 
any personal knowledge of Mr. Duran1s involvement, if any, in the 
Neely incident. Her testimony disclosed that she only suspected 
Mr. Duran of yelling and screaming and possibly throwing "commode" 
(defined by her as "shit and piss," T. 335) because she could not 
see or hear who was responsible. The following colloquy occurred 
during her testimony: 
Q: [Mr. McDougall] Did you see Mr. Duran 
throw anything? 
A: [Officer Swanti] We saw commode being 
thrown out of the cells and at that time we 
could — 
Q: You saw what? 
A: Commode. It was shit and piss. 
Q: Did you see Mr. Duran do that? 
A: Not directly but it was right there to 
where it could have been either him or the cell 
next to him. 
Q: Did you hear Mr. Duran saying anything 
during this time that you were outside? 
A: Yes. He was yelling and screaming with the 
others with the rest of the commotion. 
Q: Do you recall anything specifically that he 
yelled or screamed at that time? 
A: No because it was just they were like in 
harmony. It was everyone's voices going at the 
same time. All we were trying to do is hush 
them down so that we could let the other 
inmates who did want to sleep (T. 335-36). 
Again on cross-examination Officer Swanti testified as follows: 
Q: [Ms. Wells] When did you see or observe, 
personally, Mr. Duran involved in anything? 
A: [Officer Swanti] As we were walking down, 
okay? As we are coming down the tier, all 
right? We saw a bunch of commode being thrown 
out. All right? , 
I asked Carpenter if we could write them 
up. He said because we weren't standing right 
exactly in front of his cell, it could have 
been either him or the gentleman next to him. 
Q: Okay. | 
A: So therefore, we couldnft but the commode 
and stuff is coming out of the cell, all 
right. We are, therefore, they are all banging 
and screaming on the cages. We are walking by 
and as we are trying to get each one to settle 
down, he is standing up there doing his usual 
of screaming and yelling with the rest of them. 
As we approach, then he steps back to act 
like he is not doing anything. We no sooner 
are past his cell, then he starts in with the 
yelling. 
Q: Anything that Mi. Duran was doing was also 
being done by the other inmates; isn't that 
right? j 
A: As far as verbally yelling and stuff, yes. 
Q: What you are saying about seeing excrement 
coming out of the cell, you are not able to say 
that that came from Mr. Duran are you? 
A: No. li wdj there next to the, cell. 
Q: All right. 
Likewise. When the altercation was going 
on down on the tier below with Mr. Neely and 
Officer Carpenter, you have no knowledge of 
anything that Mr. Duran was doing up a tier 
higher; isn't that right? 
A: Well, when we were down below? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No. 
Q: When you walked by, Mr. Duran stepped back 
and was silent; isn't that right? 
A: Yes, until we passed. 
Q: And his voice then blended with everyone 
else's? 
A: Yes (T. 341-43). 
This testimony of Officer Swanti demonstrates that she had no 
additional evidence to justify acting Lieutenant Yakovich's decision 
to move Mr. Duran to maximum security. Officer Swanti's information 
was mere conjecture and speculation at best; accordingly, acting 
Lieutenant Yakovich's decision was ill based.2 
As the decision to move Mr. Duran to maximum security was 
without support, the appearance of the three officers in Mr. Duran's 
2
 The other information purportedly relied on by Yakovich 
would likewise fail to support the decision. The other officer did 
not testify; nor did the inmate. More importantly, and even if that 
testimony could have been better based, such testimony would not 
have negated the need to have a hearing prior to the move to maximum 
security. See Point I A 1, Supra. Mr. Duran had the right to hear 
the stories proferred by the others and to tell his side as well. 
Such a hearing would also have disclosed biases, prejudices, 
misrepresentations, and attempts to manipulate which appear wholly 
possible from the facts of this case as indicated. 
cell was unjustified and the demands they made of Mr. Duran were 
equally unlawful. 
B. MR. DURAN LAWFULLY DEFENDED HIMSELF AGAINST 
THE UNLAWFUL ACTIONS OF THE PRISON GUARDS. 
Inasmuch as the actions of acting Lieutenant Yakovich and 
Officers tlMdtti and 01m were without jitbl 11 i oat i <>n (oee Point 1 A 
1 and 2, supra), Mt . Duran was within his right to defend himself 
against the officers' unlawful force. In State v. Bradshaw, S41 
P.2d 800 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that a statute 
which made a person guilty of interfering with a police officer if 
they resisted an arrest, whether it was lawful or not, was 
unconstitutional. From that action one may infer that it is lawful 
to resist an unlawful arrest. The replacement statute to the one 
held unconstitutional now limits the nil * tIer Mice with d police 
officer to only those situations where the actor has knowledge, or 
should know, that the police officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest. Utah Code Ann, <* b-h-305 (1953 as amended).3 
More than half of the jurisdictions expressly recognize 
and/or apply this traditional common law rule illo^inj t person to 
resist an unlawful arrest by the use of reasonable force. See 
Annotation: Modern Status of Rules as to Right to forcefully Resist 
3
 ^76-8-305. Interference with peace officer making 
lawful arrest, A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest 
or detention of himself or another and interferes with such arrest 
or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon. 
Illegal Arrest, 44 ALR 3d 1078 §3 (1976). Some of the jurisdictions 
even support that an arrestee may reasonably defend himself when 
greater force than is required is used against him. Id. at §6. 
In the case at bar both the above situations apply: the 
prison guards used greater force than necessary to effect the 
equivalent of an arrest, and Mr. Duran reasonably defended himself 
against the guards' unlawful attempt to move him unjustifiably to a 
more stringent and restrictive section of the prison. 
As detailed in the facts, Officer Carpenter issued a 
prison write-up on Mr. Duran for an unsupported violation and 
promised that he personally would see that Mr. Duran was next [after 
inmate Neely] to go to maximum security (T. 242-43). The following 
morning Mr. Duran was awakened by three guards at his door who then 
entered and insisted on taking him to maximum security (T. 306). 
Mr. Duran perceived this action as unlawful because he had done 
nothing wrong (T. 307). Yet, Mr. Duran still agreed to go with them 
if they would not handcuff him (T. 307). 
Mr. Duran explained that his fear of being handcuffed was 
directly related to a prior occasion when once handcuffed he was 
beaten (T. 316). He feared, reasonably so under the circumstances 
of the prior evening's exchange with Officer Carpenter and the 
presence of three guards now m his cell, that he would again be 
beaten (T. 308, 314-15, 318). 
This fear was legitimate and reasonable. As Mr. Duran 
succmtly explained from the witness stand, lf[I]t only takes one 
officer to handcuff an inmate" (T. 315), The presence of the three 
guards within his cell alsn comprised i inhaler force than necessary 
to do their stated job. Moreover, the guards indicated they could 
do it the hard way or the easy way. Under the totality of the 
circumstances, Mr. inn ni justifiably perceived a threat. He 
retreated to the back wall of his cell (T. 166, 183), and when he 
had no where else to qo he punched actim) Li * ut eridnl i'il- >vi:h the 
nose in HI effort, a he stated, "to get him away from me" (T. 313), 
or in other words, self defense. 
The defense of af-lf lefense in 1 I In del HUSH ol habitation 
are statutorily authorized in this jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. bb 
76-2-402 and 76-2-405 (1953 as amended) (See Addendum A), in I 
instructions on t h« =;H defenses were Jfiven to the jury (P Hi-12, 
114-19). The jury's decision to not find the defenses applicable 
was erroneous and unsupportable, rhe Utah Supreme "ourt in State v. 
Knoll, 712 I'.'d .11, II (Utah 1985), stated that "d defendant is 
not required to establish a defense of self defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or even bv a prepond^i n\c^ r f the H^idnnre," 
Rather, the Court explained, "if there exists a reasonable doubt in 
any case where the accused was justified or excusable , then 
there exists a reasonable duubf i1 to in qui M ." Id. at 215 
(quoting State v. Vacos, 120 P, 19/, b02 (Utah 1911)). 
That reasonable doubt existed m Mi. Duran's case such 
that it was "inherently impiobat '> th it reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, this Court has the right and 
obligation to review the jury's decision in light of the evidence 
and reverse the conviction. Id. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
MR. DURAN'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO REDUCE THE 
CHARGE AGAINST HIM TO A CLASS fA' MISDEMEANOR. 
Prior to trial Mr. Duran filed a motion to reduce the 
charge against him to a Class 'A1 Misdemeanor (R. 28-31). After 
oral argument that motion was denied by the trial court (R. 39). 
Mr. Duran contends that the trial court erred when it denied that 
motion, and he requests that this Court correct that error and grant 
him a new trial on the misdemeanor charge. 
In 1969, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the case of 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, (Utah 1969), that where the illegal 
conduct of a criminal defendant could be prohibited under two 
separate statutes with one crime proscribing a more severe 
punishment, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the lesser 
punishment. 
Mr. Duran was charged with the offense of Assault by a 
Prisoner, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 102.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The illegal 
conduct prohibited under this section is: 
§76-5-102.5 Assault by a Prisoner — Any 
prisoner who commits assault by intending to 
cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. 
However, according to §76-5-102.4 it is a Class A 
Misdemeanor if "any person" commits an assault mi i ppK'i officer. 
Seel,inn 76-5-102,4 Assault against a peace officer on Duty states 
that: 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with 
knowledge he is on duty, is guilty of a Class 
fAf Misdemeanor. 
This provision neither modifies, is made subject to, not is limited 
by S76- s- l n • '. tind'M these two statutory schemes, the same act — 
assaulting a peace officer while an inmate — is prohibited. One 
carries a misdemeanor penalty; the other is a felony. 
As inn Supreme Court did in Shondel, supra, the trial 
court should have reconciled the inconsistency, l -* Shondel, the 
Supreme Court reconciled a criminal statute niikinq possession of LSD 
a misdemeanor with an overlapping provision of Utah's Narcotic Drug 
Act which made the same offense a felony. In its ruling the Court 
stated: 
A statute creating a crime should be 
sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary 
intelligence . . . may know how to conduct 
themselves in conformity with it. 
453 P.2d at 148. 
Further, in ruling that the appellant therein was guilty 
of a misdemeanor rather than a felony, the Shondel court said that: 
A penal statute should be clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for 
its violation. 
Id. 
F i n<i 1 I y, t h*» r u 1 i \\<\ i n S h o n d e l , i s t h a t : 
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of 
two punishments is applicable to an offense an 
accused is entitled to the benefit of the 
lesser. 
Id. Mr. Duran was charged with assaulting a Utah State Correctional 
Officer. An accused cannot be reasonably expected to know that he 
could be convicted of a felony rather than a misdemeanor under these 
circumstances. 
Under the law of the State of Utah, as set forth in State 
v. Shondel, the trial court should have reduced the charge against 
Mr. Duran from the felony to the applicable misdemeanor. 
It was error for the trial court to deny the motion. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse that decision and remand for a 
new trial on the misdemeanor charge. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Duran 
respectfully asks that this Court reverse his conviction and remand 
the case to the District Court for either dismissal of the charges 
or a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fxJ~ day of August, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person - Forcible felony 
defined. - (1) A person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that such force is necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if he reasonable believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the 
circumstances specified in paragraph (1) of *"his section if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force against himself 
with the intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm 
upon the assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing 
after the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(e) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by 
agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the other 
notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use of 
unlawful force. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony 
includes aggravated assault, mayhem, murder in the first and second 
degree and manslaughter, kidnaping, and aggravated kidnaping, rape, 
forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual assault, as they are defined 
in chapter 5 of this code, and also includes arson, robbery, and 
burglary, as defined in chapter 6 of this code. Any other felony 
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person 
so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily 
injury also constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, 
as defined in section 76-6-204, shall not constitute a forcible 
felony except where the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful 
entry is made or attempted. 
76-2-405. For.*- in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or 
attack upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the use of 
force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and 
tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably 
believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling, or 
being in the habitation and he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or 
attempted for the purpose of committing a felony in the habitation 
and that the force is necessary to prevent the commission of the 
felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of 
habitation is presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal 
cases to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent 
peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or attempted 
entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force, or in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
